Publications

Principal's Distributive Preferences and the Incentivization of Agents with Max Lobeck, Experimental Economics, forthcoming

Do principals' distributive preferences affect the allocation of incentives within firms? We run a Principal-Agent lab experiment, framed as a firm setting. In the experiment, subjects are randomized in the principal or worker position. Principals must choose piece rate wage contracts for two workers that differ in terms of ability. Workers have to choose an effort level that is non-contractible. Principals are either paid in proportion to the output produced (Stakeholder treatment) or paid a fixed wage (Spectator treatment). We study how principals make trade-offs between incentive concerns (motivating workers to maximize output) and their own normative distributive preferences. We find that, despite the firm-frame and the moral hazard situation, principals do hold egalitarian concerns, as principals are on average willing to trade off their firm's performance (and so their own income) for more wage equality among their workers. The willingness to reduce inequality among workers is sensitive to both extensive and intensive margin incentives, which shows that principals' choices are shaped by incentives that they face themselves.

Preferences over Income Distribution: Evidence from a Choice Experiment with Max Lobeck, Claudia Senik and Thierry Verdier, Journal of Economic Psychology, 2019

Using a choice experiment in the lab, we assess the relative importance of different attitudes to income inequality. We elicit subjects' preferences regarding pairs of payoff distributions within small groups, in a firm-like setting. We find that distributions that satisfy the Pareto-dominance criterion attract unanimous suffrage: all subjects prefer larger inequality provided it makes everyone weakly better off. This is true no matter whether payoffs are based on merit or luck. Unanimity only breaks once subjects' positions within the income distribution are fixed and known ex-ante. Even then, 75% of subjects prefer Pareto-dominant distributions, but 25% of subjects engage in money burning at the top in order to reduce inequality, even when it does not make anyone better off. A majority of subjects embrace a more equal distribution if their own income or overall efficiency is not at stake. When their own income is at stake and the sum of payoffs remains unaffected, 20% of subjects are willing to pay for a lower degree of inequality.

Happy People Have Children: Choice and Self-selection into Parenthood with Andrew Clark and Claudia Senik, European Journal of Population, 2016

There is mixed evidence in the existing literature on whether children are associated with greater subjective well-being, with the correlation depending on which countries and populations are considered. We here provide a systematic analysis of this question based on three different datasets: two cross-national and one national panel. We show that the association between children and subjective well-being is positive only in developed countries, and for those who become parents after the age of 30 and who have higher income. We also provide evidence of a positive selection into parenthood, whereby happier individuals are more likely to have children.

Non peer-reviewed publications

Les Français face aux grands risques with Ludivine Gilli, Guillaume Gueguen and Claudia Senik, Note de l’OBE - CEPREMAP, 2022

Reputation effects of nuclear accidents with Ludivine Pascucci-Cahen, Les Entretiens du Risque, 2021

Working papers

Ethnic bias, economic success, and trust: findings from large sample experiments in Germany and the U.S. , with Yann Algan, Gianluca Grimalda, Fabrice Murtin, Louis Putterman, Ulrich Schmidt, Vincent Siegerink, OECD Working paper

We study ethnic discrimination in online trust games played by two large representative samples of the US and Germany. Discrimination along ethnic lines is significant in both countries. In the US, members of the three largest ethnic groups trust more people from their own ethnic group than those from other groups. African Americans discriminate more than White Americans and Hispanics. Discrimination is not selective, as each group tends to discriminate against the two other ethnic groups at roughly the same rate. In contrast, ethnic discrimination is strongly selective in Germany, subjects of German parentage discriminate twice as much against Turkish descent participants as against Eastern European participants. Members of both ethnic minorities in Germany discriminate against each other, but do not discriminate against ones of German parentage. We also examine whether releasing information on the trustee being rich reduces discrimination. We conjecture that this is a way to remove the stereotype that ethnic minorities are undeserving poor. We show that, in this case, discrimination by the ethnic majority is indeed reduced. People of Turkish descent who are rich tend to be trusted relatively more than lower-income people of Turkish descent. However, releasing information on income can backfire, as it can increase mistrust within minorities. Finally, we show that group loyalty exists not only according to ethnicity but also according to income, as rich German parentage subjects trust other rich in-group members significantly more than do non-rich Germans.

Doctoral dissertation

Link to the full text of my doctoral dissertation here